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Abstract
Replay attack is considered a common attacking technique that is used by adversaries to gain access to
confidential information. Several approaches have been proposed to prevent replay attack in security-critical
systems such as Automated Teller Machines (ATM) systems. Among those approaches is a recent one
called the Mutual Chain Authentication Protocol for the Saudi Payments Network transactions (MCAP).
This protocol aims to allow Saudi banking systems to overcome existing weaknesses in the currently
used Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) protocols. In this paper, we analyze and verify the recent MCAP
authentication protocol against replay attacks. Therefore, we examine the mutual authentication between the
ATM Terminal, Sponsoring Banks (SBAT), Saudi Payments Network (SPAN) and the Issuing of Financial
Bank (CIFI). The paper also provides a formal analysis of the MCAP to conduct formal proofs of the MCAP
protocols against replay attacks.
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1 Introduction
Protecting critical data in financial systems from being exploited by unauthorized parties is a major concern.
As the number of payment networks increases, the services they provide increase rapidly. Providing these
services to customers in a secure way is the main challenge. In many cases, attackers can easily gain access
to information during transmissions across the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) networks. This can allow
them to gain unauthorized access to the sponsoring banks or the issuing of financial bank to whom they are not
allowed to access.
MCAP protocol [1] was proposed to be used for SPAN transactions in Saudi Arabia banking systems in order
to solve existing vulnerabilities in the current two-factor-authentication (2FA) protocol [2] [3]. MCAP is
defined as an Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (AKA) which uses pre-loaded shared keys between
authentication entities [4] [5]. Moreover, MCAP meets all the security requirements of ATM systems specified
by Singh et al. [6]. Therefore, there are no input authentication variables are transported as plain texts by
the authentication messages between the ATM system components. Furthermore, the mutual authentication
between all the ATM system components is achieved. This means that ATM card holders must prove themselves
to the system in order for the system to prove itself to the network. In general, the MCAP protocol is resistant
against the known attacks such as Replay attack, and hence this paper aims to prove such hypothesis using a
formal verification approach.
Technically, replay attacks aim to maliciously or fraudulently repeat transmission of valid data through the
originator or an adversary who can capture the data and redirect it to unauthorized sides [7] [8] [9] [10]. If
messages are exchanged in such an authentication protocol that does not carry appropriate freshness identifiers,
then an adversary can easily get authenticated by replaying messages copied from a legitimate authentication
session between authentication entities [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12].
The main purpose of this paper is to perform an evaluation of the MCAP objectives and analyze it against replay
attack using a formal verification approach. Formal verification is the use of mathematical techniques to ensure
that a certain design conforms to some precisely expressed notion of functional correctness. The absence of
formal methods for verification of security protocols could lead to security errors remaining undetected [13].
Moreover, formal verification techniques can provide a systematic way of discovering protocol flaws [14] [15]
[16] [17] [18] [19] [20]. This allows us to check if there are any inconsistencies might exist in the MCAP. Then,
we use a formal verification approach called the BAN logic formal methods on the MCAP protocol to prove
that no threats or vulnerabilities can be exploited in MCAP as a result of replay attack methods [21] [22] [23].
Unfortunately, we are not able to compare our protocol with others since this protocol has been recently
proposed and there is no similar protocol which is specifically defined for the case of banking systems in
Saudi Arabia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the MCAP authentication
protocol. Section 3 illustrates a security analysis of the MCAP protocol against replay attacks. Then, we
formally verify the security of the MCAP authentication protocol against replay attack using the BAN logic
formal method in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the salient results of the paper.
2 Overview of MCAP Protocol
According to the specifications of MCAP [1], the mutual chain in the authentication session consists of four
pairs of initiator-responder messages. These pairs are divided into two classes (direct and indirect) [1]. In direct
class, the mutual authentications between (ATM terminals and Sponsoring banks (SBAT)), (SBAT and SPAN),
and (SPAN and CIFI) depend on the values of (old and new) transaction numbers as freshness values. On the
2
Nashwan and Alshammari; BJMCS, 22(1), 1-14, 2017; Article no.BJMCS.32744
other hand, the mutual authentications between (ATM terminal and Issuing of Financial Bank (CIFI)) in indirect
class depend on the value of (RAND) that is created by the ATM terminal and ATM Card Identity (ACI).
2.1 Direct class of mutual authentication
Direct mutual authentication during the authentication session between the authentication entities is shown
in Fig. 1. The initiator (I) begins authorization by sending a challenge expected value that represents the
authentication request message. In Fig. 1.a, the ATM terminal sends XRES2 value to SBAT. It is an encrypted
value generated from a new transaction number SQNATMS + 1 (i.e., the Sequence number of ATM terminal and
SBAT) exclusive-or (XOR)with the identity number of the ATM terminal (AMID) based on the pre-loaded shard
key (K2) between the ATM terminal and SBAT. In Fig. 1.b, the SBAT sends XRES3 value to SPAN. XRES3 is
an encrypted value of a new transaction number SQNSS + 1 ( i.e., the Sequence number of SBAT and SPAN)
of SBAT exclusive-or (XOR) with AMID based on the pre-loaded shard key (K3) between the SBAT and SPAN.
In Fig. 1.c, the SPAN sends XRES4 value to CIFI which is an encrypted value of AMID based on the pre-loaded
shard key (K4) between the SPAN and CIFI.
Fig. 1. Direct Mutual Authentication (ATM terminal, SBAT, SAPN, CIFI)
In the opposite direction, the responder (R) sends back the expected response value which represents the
authentication response message. In fig. 1.c, the CIFI sends back RES4 value to the SPAN. RES4 is an encrypted
value of a new transaction number SQNCS + 1 (i.e., next Sequence transaction number between CIFI and
SPAN) exclusive-or (XOR) with the (AMID) based on (K4). In Fig. 1.b, the SPAN sends back RES3 value to
SBAT. RES3 is an encrypted value of AMID based on (K3). In Fig. 1.a, the SBAT sends backs RES2 value to the
ATM terminal. RES2 is an encrypted value of AMID based on (K2).
2.2 Indirect class of mutual authentication
Fig. 2 shows the indirect mutual authentication during the authentication session between the ATM terminal
and the CIFI authentication entities. The initiator (I ! ATM Terminal) begins authorization by sending a
challenge expected value (ISID | | XACI | | XRES1) to CIFI through SBAT and SPAN entities. XRES1 is
an encrypted value of (RAND) based on the pre-loaded shard key (K1) between the ATM terminal and CIFI.
XACI is an encrypted value of the ATM card identity (ACI) exclusive-or (XOR) with the identity number of
the ATM terminal (AMID) based on (K1). In the opposite direction, the responder (R!CIFI) sends back the
expected response value (RES1) to the ATM terminal through the same direction and authentication entities of
the challenge message, which is an encrypted value of (RAND +1).
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Fig. 2. Indirect Mutual Authentication (ATM Terminal - CIFI)
3 Security Analysis of MCAP Against Replay Attacks
Security protocols are often used to ensure secure communications in a hostile environment. Authenti-cation
protocols are always vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as message replay, data interception and manipulation,
repudiation, and impersonation. Therefore, it is necessary for systems’ designers to have some degree of
assurance before enforcing any authentication protocol [14].
Attacking authentication protocols using replay attacks approach can be done using the authentication request
message (challenge message of initiator), authentication response message (response message of responder)
or may be based on both messages [14]. If messages in any authentication protocol are exchanged without
appropriate freshness identifiers, then an adversary can easily get themselves authenticated by replaying messages
copied from a legitimate authentication session. In MCAP, the freshness identifiers are used in both direct and
indirect class mutual authentication [1].
Results of MCAP authentication processes for all authentication events are completely ciphered based on the
ciphered keys (EK1, EK2, EK3 and EK4) [1]. All authentication streams whether they are initiator or responder
messages must contain ciphered variables [1]. These processes use the pre-loaded ciphered keys without
transferring the value of the cipher keys between the entities of ATM systems [1].
In the direct class, authentication processes between all entities are represented by a mutual of Challenge and
Response ciphered messages [(XRES2/RES2), (XRES3/RE3) and (XRES4/RES4)], which are computed based
on the cipher keys (EK2, EK3 and EK4) consequently [1]. These mutual cipher messages depend on the freshness
parameters (SQN) that are included in the system entities databases. They also depend on the AMID parameter
that is attached to the authentication request message by the SBAT entity. When the initiator sends a challenge
message as a cipher stream to the next system entity, the authentication entity evaluates the freshness of the SQN
value by two values to check whether these values are equal or not. One of these values is the SQNnew which
is extracted from the output of the decryption process (XRES value), while the other is the SQNold which is
included in the database of the system entity. In case both values (SQNnew and SQNold) are in range, then the
authentication entity sends an authentication request to the next system entity. On the other hand, a mismatch
message is transmitted to the initiator. At the opposite side, the AMID value is validated by the authentication
entity through comparing the AMID that is fetched from the decryption value of RES with the value that is
attached to the authentication request message. In case they are not in rang, then a mismatch authentication
message is returned.
In indirect class, authentication processes are performed between ATM Terminal and CIFI based on the XRES1,
XACI and RES1 values. The ATM Terminal performs authentication processes by calculating XRES1 and
XACI values depending on the pre-loaded shred key (EK1) so it can authenticate itself to the CIFI. In each
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authentication session, the ATM terminal computes a new RAND value which is used to modify the XRES1 and
XACI values. At the opposite side, CIFI performs an authentication process to find RES1 value which depends
on the same cipher key (i.e., EK1). This process is conducted in order for CIFI to authenticate itself to the
ATM terminal. RES1 value can be also changed based on the incremental value of (RAND + 1).
The freshness values of RAND, AMID, and SQNS of transactions (SQNATMS, SQNSS, and SQNCS) generate different
challenge and response messages for each authentication session. If the same ATM card holder uses the same
ATM Terminal, the previous challenge message cannot be used again. Moreover, the attacker can neither
play the role of an intruder entity, access the provided services, nor impersonate legal users between legal
authentication entities.
4 Formal Analysis of MCAP Protocol
BAN logic represents a powerful tool to describe and validate authentication protocols [19]. It provides a formal
method for reasoning about the beliefs of principals in authentication protocols [19] [24] [25]. Its main objective
is to believe that a message is authentic if it is encrypted with a relevant key and fresh in each authentication
session of the authentication protocol [15] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30].
In this section, we use BAN logic approach to formalize and prove that MCAP [1] protocol is resistant against
replay attacks. In order to achieve this goal, we have to address two principles. The first one is related to
proving that if an initiator sends a challenge request message (whether in indirect or direct class) to a responder
for the first time and it receives that message back from the responder which depends on the freshness value of
RAND and SQN, then the initiator ought to believe that the responder’s message is fresher than its message.
The second principle is related to proving that if the initiator believes that only the responder knows the pre-
loaded shared key, then the initiator ought to believe that any encrypted message has been received from a legal
responder.
In the following sections, we provide an illustration for BAN notations and deduction rules which are of interest
to our case. We also show how to formally prove that MCAP is resistant against replay attacks using BAN logic
rules. This followed by a section that summarizes our findings and results.
4.1 BAN logic notations
The definition of BAN logic notations and their implications are presented in Fig. 3 (assuming P and Q are
network agents, X is a message, and K is an encryption key).
4.2 BAN logic deduction rules
The deduction rules that are used in the analysis of the proposed scheme are described below [15] [19]. Each
rule has the form:
hypotheses
conclusion
[name]
where the judgment appearing as the conclusion is considered valid if the hypotheses are all true.
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Fig. 3. BAN Logic Notations Used in Contexts
4.2.1 The message meaning rule
This rule concerns the interpretation of messages and helps to explain the origin of the messages for a shared
key.
Pj  P< K > Q;P/{X}K
Pj  Q j X [Message Meaning Rule]
This rule indicates that if P believes that K is a good key for P and Q, and P sees that X is encrypted with K,
then P believes that Q once said X.
4.2.2 The nonce verification rule
This rule ensures that decryption of a message only says that it was uttered at some point (possibly in the
past). It reflects the essence of Challenge/Response protocols (fresh statement is a challenge) and any message
contains that challenge is also fresh.
6
Nashwan and Alshammari; BJMCS, 22(1), 1-14, 2017; Article no.BJMCS.32744
Pj  {X};Pj  Q j X
Pj  Q j  X [Nonce Verification Rule]
This rule indicates that if P believes that X was said recently, and that Q said X, then P believes that Q believes
X.
4.2.3 The jurisdiction rule
This rule states what it means for a principle to be the trusted authority on the truth of X.
Pj  Q) X ;Pj  Q j  X
Pj  X [Jurisdiction Rule]
This rule indicated that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X, then P trusts Q on the truth of X.
4.2.4 The seeing rule
This rule says that a principle sees all the components of every message it sees, providing that the principle
knows the necessary key.
P/ (X ;Y )
P/ (X)
[Seeing Rule (1)]
Pj  P< K > Q;P/{X}K
P/X
[Seeing Rule (2)]
If a principle sees a formula, then it can see its components (provided keys are known).
P j  #(X)
P j  #(X ;Y ) [Seeing Rule (3)]
If part of a formula is known to be fresh, then the entire formula is fresh.
4.2.5 The belief rule
This rule states that a principle believes a collection of statements, if and only if it believes each statement
individually.
P j  (X ;Y )
P j  X [Belief Rule]
In this rule, P believes a set of statements if and only if P believes each individual statement.
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4.3 Security proof
The prevention of MCAP protocol against the replay attack can be proved through the following four steps:
1. Transforming the MCAP protocol into an idealized form.
2. Identifying the initial assumptions using BAN logic.
3. Deducing new predicates using the BAN logic rules.
4. Showing that the goals of MCAP protocol have been met.
The first step relates to idealizing the MCAP protocol. The original version of the MCAP protocol without
idealization form is shown below.
 Message (1) : ATM terminal! SBAT : ISID j j {XACI j jXRES1}K1 j j {XRES2}K2.
 Message (2) : SBAT ! SPAN : ISID j j {XACI j jXRES1}K1 j j {XRES3}K3.
 Message (3) : SPAN!CIFI : ISID j j {XACI j jXRES1}K1 j j {XRES4}K4.
 Message (4) : CIFI! SPAN : {RES1}K1 j j {RES4}K4.
 Message (5) : SPAN! SBAT : {RES1}K1 j j {RES3}K3.
 Message (6) : SBAT ! ATM Terminal : {RES1;RES2}K1.
We idealize theMCAP protocol through replacing the challenge and response messages with idealized messages.
Each authentication entity sees the following messages.
 Idealized Message (1) : CIFI / (ISID;XACI;XRES;XRES4)
 Idealized Message (2) : SPAN / (ISID;XACI;XRES;XRES3)
 Idealized Message (3) : SPAN / (RES1;RES4)
 Idealized Message (4) : SBAT / (ISID;XACI;XRES1;XRES3)
 Idealized Message (5) : SBAT / (RES1;RES3)
 Idealized Message (6) : ATM Terminal / (RES1;RES2)
The second step of proving that our MCAP protocol is resistant against replay attacks is to identify a set of
assumptions using BAN logic. The initial suppositions of the MCAP indicate that all the authentication entities
can use a shared key to communicate whether in challenge or response messages as follows.
 Supposition (1) : CIFI < K1> ATM Terminal [For Indirect Class]
 Supposition (2) : SBAT < K2> ATM Terminal [For Direct Class]
 Supposition (3) : SBAT < K3> SPAN [For Direct Class]
 Supposition (4) : CIFI < K4> SPAN [For Direct Class]
The third and fourth step of proving that our MCAP protocol is resistant against replay attacks is to deduce new
predicates using the BAN logic rules and show that the objectives of MCAP are met. We conduct these two last
steps on the direct class communications and then on the indirect class communications as follows.
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4.3.1 Direct class security proof
In this part, we show how to prove that our MCAP protocol is secured against the replay attacks in direct class
communications (i.e., SBAT and ATM Terminal, SPAN and SBAT, and CIFI and SPAN).
A) SBAT and ATM Terminal:
The first part of this proof is to show that SBAT believes that the per-loaded shared key with an ATM terminal,
and that ATM terminal believes that the per-loaded shared key with the SBAT. Hence, the SBAT believes that
the value of XRES2 is fresh and the ATM terminal believes that the value of RES2 is fresh. The set of principles
which we aim to prove here are as follows.
SBAT j  SBAT < K2> ATM Terminal (GA1)
SBAT j  #(XRES2) (GA2)
ATM Terminal j  ATM Terminal < K2> SBAT (GA3)
ATM Terminal j  #(RES2) (GA4)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 2 of the MCAP protocol, we get the
following. SBAT j  SBAT <K2> ATM Terminal;SBAT /{XRES2}K2=SBAT j  ATM Terminal j (XRES2)
and SBAT j  ATM Terminal j (XRES2). If we say that (ATM SQNnew == ATM SQNold + 1), then we can
prove the following.
SBAT j  SBAT < K2> ATM Terminal (GA1)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (SQNnew == ATM SQNold+1), then the
value of XRES2 is fresh. If we know that (SBAT j  #(XRES2);SBAT j ATM Terminal j (XRES2)=SBAT j 
ATM Terminal j  (XRES2)), then this leads to (SBAT j  ATM Terminal j  (XRES2)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can prove that (SBAT j  ATM Terminal j ) (XRES2);SBAT j 
ATM Terminal j  (XRES2)=SBAT j  ATM Terminal), and this leads to deduce the following, SBAT j 
(XRES2) , and therefore we prove the following.
SBAT j  #(XRES2) (GA2)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 2 in the MCAP protocol, it can be
shown that (ATM Terminal j ATM Terminal <K2> SBAT;ATM Terminal /{RES2}K2=ATM Terminal j 
SBAT j (RES2)) and (ATM Terminal j  SBAT j (RES2)). If we can say that (AMID== AMID), then we can
deduce the following.
ATM Terminal j  ATM Terminal < K2> SBAT (GA3)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (AMID == AMID), then the value of
(RES2) is fresh. If we say that (ATM Terminal j  #(RES2);ATM Terminal j  SBAT j (RES2)=ATM Terminal j 
SBAT j  (RES2)). This leads to the following, (ATM Terminal j  SBAT j  (RES2) and ATM Terminal j 
SBAT j  #(RES2)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we get (SBAT j  ATM Terminal j ) (RES2);SBAT j  ATM Terminal j 
(RES2)=SBAT j  ATM Terminal), which leads to deducing that (ATM Terminal j  (RES2)), and hence
proving the following.
ATM Terminal j  #(RES2) (GA4)
B) SPAN and SBAT:
The second set of goals is to prove that SPAN believes that the per-loaded shared key with SBAT, and to prove
that SBAT believes that the per-loaded shared key with SPAN. An additional goal is to prove that SPAN and
9
Nashwan and Alshammari; BJMCS, 22(1), 1-14, 2017; Article no.BJMCS.32744
SBAT believe that the value of (XRES3) is fresh. The set of principles which we aim to prove in this part are
as follows.
SPAN j  SPAN < K3> SBAT (GB1)
SPAN j  #(XRES3) (GB2)
SBAT j  SBAT < K3> SPAN (GB3)
SBAT j  #(RES3) (GB4)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 3 of the MCAP protocol, we get that
(SPAN j  SPAN < K3> SBAT;SPAN /{XRES3}K3=SPAN j  SBAT j (XRES3), thus, SPAN j  SBAT
j (XRES3)). If we say that (SQNSSnew == SQNSSnew(out put o f f4)), then we can deduce the following.
SPAN j  SPAN < K3> SBAT (GB1)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (SQNSSold == SQNSSnew), then the
value of (XRES3) is fresh. Furthermore, (SPAN j  #(RES3);SPAN j  SBAT j (XRES3)=SPAN j  SBAT j 
(XRES3)). This leads to (SPANj  SBAT j  (XRES3) and SPANj  SBAT j  #(XRES3)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can prove that (SPAN j  SBAT j ) (XRES3);SPAN j  SBAT j 
(XRES3)=SPANj  SBAT ). This leads to deduce that (SPAN j  (XRES3)), and hence,
SPAN j  #(XRES3) (GB2)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 2 in the MCAP protocol, (SBAT j 
SBAT < K3 > SPAN;SBAT / {RES3}K3=SBAT j  SPAN j (RES3)), and thus, (SBAT j  SPAN j (RES3)).
Since (AMID== AMID(out put o f f6)), then we can prove the following.
SBAT j  SBAT < K3> SPAN (GB3)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (AMID == AMID), then the value of
(RES3) is fresh. (SBAT j  #(RES3);SBAT j  SPAN j (RES3)=SBAT j  SPAN j  (RES3)). This leads to the
following. (SBAT j  SPAN j  (RES3) and SBAT j  SPAN j  #(RES3)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can show that (SPAN j  SBAT j ) (RES3);SPANj  SBAT j  (RES3)=
SPAN j  SBAT ). This can lead to (SBAT j  (RES3)), and this proves the following.
SBAT j  #(RES3) (GB4)
C) CIFI and SPAN:
The third set of goals is to prove CIFI believes that the per-loaded shared key with SPAN and SPAN believes
that the per-loaded shared key with CIFI. It also aims to prove that CIFI and SPAN believe that the value of
(XRES4) is fresh. Below are the set of goals that we aim to prove in this part.
CIFI j CIFI < K4> SPAN (GC1)
CIFI j  #(XRES4) (GC2)
SPAN j  SPAN < K4>CIFI (GC3)
SPAN j  #(RES4) (GC4)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 3 of the MCAP protocol, we can say
that (CIFI j  CIFI < K4 > SPAN;CIFI / {XRES4}K4=CIFI j  SPAN j (XRES3)), and thus (CIFI j 
SPAN j (XRES4)). If we say that (AMID(out put o f f12) == AMID(out put o f f1)), then we can deduce
the following.
CIFI j CIFI < K4> SPAN (GC1)
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By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (AMID == AMID), then the value
of (XRES4) is fresh. This leads to (CIFI j  #(XRES4);CIFI j  SPAN j (XRES4)=CIFI j  SPAN j 
(XRES4)), (CIFIj  SPAN j  (XRES3)), and (CIFIj  SPAN j  #(XRES4)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can prove that (CIFI j  SPAN j ) (XRES4);CIFI j  SPAN j 
(XRES4)=CIFIj  SPAN). This leads to deduce that (CIFI j  (XRES4)), and hence this proves the following.
CIFI j  #(XRES4) (GC2)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 4 in the MCAP protocol, (SPAN j 
SPAN < K4 > CIFI;SBAT / {RES4}K4=SPAN j  CIFI j (RES4)), and thus (SPAN j  CIFI j (RES4)).
Since (SQNCSold == SQNCSnew(out put o f f5)), then we can prove the following.
SPAN j  SPAN < K4>CIFI (GC3)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (SQNCSold == SQNCSnew), then the value
of (RES4) is fresh.
Since (SPANj  #(RES4);SPANj CIFI j (RES4)=SPAN j CIFI j  (RES4)), then this leads to the following
(SPAN j CIFI j  (RES4)) and (SPAN j CIFI j  #(RES4)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can show that (CIFI j  SPAN j ) (RES4);CIFIj  SPAN j  (RES4)=
CIFI j  SPAN). This leads to (SPAN j  (RES4)) which proves the following.
SPAN j  #(RES4) (GC4)
4.3.2 Indirect class security proof
In this section, we aim to prove the fourth set of goals of the MCAP protocol. This aims to prove that CIFI
believes that the per-loaded shared key with an ATM terminal, and that ATM terminal believes that the per-
loaded shared key with the CIFI (Mutually authentication key establishment between CIFI and ATM terminal).
In this section, we also aim to prove that the CIFI believes that the value of (XACI) is fresh and the ATM
terminal believes that the value of (RES1) is fresh. The set of principles which we aim to prove in this part are
as follows.
CIFI j CIFI < K1> ATM Terminal (GD1)
CIFI j  #(XACI) (GD2)
ATM Terminal j  ATM Terminal < K1>CIFI (GD3)
ATM Terminal j  #(RES1) (GD4)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 3 of the MCAP protocol, we can say
that (CIFI j  CIFI < K1 > ATM Terminal;CIFI / {XACI}K1=CIFI j  ATM Terminal j (XACI)), hence
(CIFI j  ATM Terminal j (XACI)). If we say that (ACI == ACI) and (AMID== AMID(out put o f f12)),
then we can deduce the following.
CIFI j CIFI < K1> ATM Terminal (GD1)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (ACI == ACI) and (AMID== AMID),
then the value of (XRES1) is fresh. This leads to (CIFI j  #(XACI);CIFI j  ATM Terminal j (XACI)
=CIFI j ATM Terminal j  (XACI)), (CIFIj ATM Terminal j  (XACI)), and (CIFIj ATM Terminal j 
#(XACI)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can prove that (CIFI j  ATM Terminal j ) (XACI);CIFI j  ATM
Terminal j  (XACI)=CIFIj  ATM Terminal). Then, this leads to deduce that (CIFI j  (XACI)) which
proves the following.
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CIFI j  #(XACI) (GD2)
By applying the Message Meaning rule and according to Supposition 1 in the MCAP protocol, (ATM Terminal
j  ATM Terminal < K1 > CIFI;ATM Terminal / {RES1}K1=ATM Terminal j  CIFI j (RES1)), and
(ATM Terminal j  CIFI j (RES1)). Since ((RAND(out put o f f0) == RAND(out put o f f3)), then we
can prove the following.
ATM Terminal j  ATM Terminal < K1>CIFI (GD3)
By applying the Nonce Verification rule and according to the fact that (RAND(out put o f f0) == RAND
(out put o f f3)), then the value of (RES1) is fresh. Since (ATM Terminalj j  #(RES1);ATM Terminalj j 
CIFI j (RES1)=ATM Terminal j CIFI j  (RES1)), then this leads to (ATM Terminal j CIFI j  (RES1)
and ATM Terminal j CIFI j  #(RES1)).
By applying the Jurisdiction rule, we can show that (CIFI j ATM Terminal j) (RES1);CIFIj ATM Terminal
j  (RES1)=CIFI j  ATM Terminal). This leads to (ATM Terminal j  (RES1)) which proves the following.
ATM Terminal j  #(RES1) (GD4)
Table 1. Mutual Authentication Deduction Rules for MCAP
Keys
Authentication
Entities
Mutual Authentication Deduction Rules
FreshMessage Deduction
Rules
K1
ATM Terminal &
CIFI
CIFI j  CIFI < K1 > ATM Terminal and
ATM Terminal j  ATM Terminal < K1 >
CIFI
ATM Terminalj j 
#(RES1) and
CIFIj  #(XACI)
K2
ATM Terminal &
SBAT
SBAT j  SBAT < K2 > ATM Terminal and
ATM Terminal j  ATM Terminal < K2 >
SBAT
ATM Terminalj j 
#(RES2) and
SBAT j  #(XRES2)
K3 SBAT & SPAN
SPAN j  SPAN < K3> SBAT and SBAT j 
SBAT < K3> SPAN
SBAT  #(RES3) and
SPANj  #(XRES3)
K4 SPAN & CIFI
SPAN j  SPAN < K4 >CIFI and CIFI j 
CIFI < K4> SPAN
SPAN  #(RES4) and
CIFIj  #(XRES4)
4.4 Summary of security proofs
By following the notations and deduction rules that are presented in the previous section, we prove that MCAP
protocol is resistant against the replay attacks. These Mutual Authentication Deduction Rules for MCAP can
be summarized as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that if the initiator’s challenge request message in the MCAP protocol has never been sent to the
responder and the initiator receives the response message which depends on the freshness from the responder,
then the initiator ought to believe that the responder’s message is fresher than its message. It also shows that if
all initiators believe that only the responder knows the pre-loaded shared key, then the initiator ought to believe
that any encrypted message has been received is from a legal responder. In this paper, we have also shown that
all suppositions in Section 4 are achieved, and therefore the MCAP protocol can be considered secure against
the replay attack.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown how to analyze and verify that the MCAP protocol is secure against replay attacks. In
order to achieve this goal, we had to analyze the differences between the mutual authentications whether during
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direct or indirect authentication entities. Then, we provided a formal analysis of the MCAP protocol using the
BAN logic approach. The formal analysis proved that the trusted relation between the authentication entities
can be achieved by preventing the acceptance of any challenge or response messages that do not have fresh
values. Therefore, the MCAP protocol sets up a secure connection between the authentication entities and
prevents the possibility of replay attacks.
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